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Abstract:  In recent years, in the face of potentially debilitating environmental, economic, and 
nutritional  disaster,  Americans  have  begun  to  embrace  the  idea  of  local,  sustainable,  and 
minimally processed foods.  At the same time, a rash of pathogen outbreaks in our nation’s 
produce  supply  has  created  a  mistrust  of  the  nation’s  supply  of  fruits  and  vegetables  and 
instigated a call for heightened regulation and oversight of our nation’s farms and processing 
plants.  Against the background of these two strains of political discourse, this Article analyzes 
recent proposed legislation for food safety regulation.  Rather than succumb to the knee-jerk 
reaction of “more regulation is always better,” legislators and regulators should combine both 
critiques  into  a  nuanced  approach  to  food  regulation  that  will  encourage  both  safety  and 
sustainability by bolstering small family farms’ ability to produce foods locally. 
INTRODUCTION. 
  In  his  popular  book  The  Omnivore’s  Dilemma,  author  and  journalist  Michael  Pollan 
complained  that  the  highly  processed  foods  that  dominate  an  American  supermarket  are 
extremely removed from the soil and farms from which they originated: “I realized that the 
straightforward  question  ‘What  should  I  eat?’  could  no  longer  be  answered  without  first 
addressing two other even more straightforward questions: ‘What am I eating?  And where in the 
world did it come from?’  Not very long ago an eater didn’t need a journalist to answer these 
questions.”
1    Pollan’s  wistful  nostalgia  for  an  era  of  simpler,  more  sustainable  food  echoes 
throughout the United States. In recent years, consumers have bolstered the market share of food 
labeled “organic,” both at Wal-mart and Whole Foods.  The “Buy Local” movement has gained 
political  traction  outside  of  tiny  leftwing  communities  Berkeley,  California.    Even  the  First 
                                                 
1 MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 17 
(2006).   2 
Family has planted a vegetable garden not out of necessity or war-time effort but as a political 
statement in support of healthy, environmentally conscious eating.
2 
   The  nostalgia  surrounding  simply  grown  and  barely  processed  food  runs  parallel  to 
rising fear in the face of a seeming slew of public health disasters. With complicated supply 
chains  connecting  seemingly  unrelated  farm  locations  and  foods,  each  outbreak  or  crop 
contamination affects huge ranges of consumer products available at the supermarket.  In the 
past few years, national outbreaks of E. coli, salmonella, and other contaminants have affected 
the whole nation’s supply of spinach (in fall 2006), lettuce (also fall 2006), peppers and possibly 
tomatoes (summer 2008), peanuts (winter 2009), and pistachios (spring 2009), killing hundreds 
and infecting thousands of Americans.  Smaller contaminations have also littered the national 
food landscape.
3 And when a crop sneaks its way into all sorts of products, the effect is even 
more pervasive.  The recent peanut product recall is a particularly good example:  as of April 23, 
2009,  3913  products  had  been  voluntarily  recalled  and  reported  to  the  Food  and  Drug 
Administration (FDA) as a result of a salmonella outbreak in the crop distributed by the Peanut 
Corporation of America anywhere between January 2007 and February 2009.
4  Even when a 
                                                 
2 Marian Burros, Obamas Prepare to Plant Vegetable Garden at White House, N.Y.TIMES, 
March 20, 2009, at A1. 
3 Outbreaks affecting food less dominant in our country’s eating habits have not had as much 
press, but have been similarly extensive with respect to that crop’s market share.  In fall 2003, 
hepatitis A outbreaks were associated with green onions from Mexico, economically wounding 
all growers, even those with strong food safety programs.  Linda Clavin, Belem Avendano, & 
Rita Schwentesius, USDA, The Economics of Food Safety: The Case of Green Onions and 
Hepatitis A Outbreaks, VGS-305-01, Dec. 2004, at 2. Imported pet food was contaminated with 
melamine in early 2007; ground beef patties in the Northeast (and Florida) were infected with E. 
Coli O157 in fall 2007; oysters harvested from the gulf of Mexico were infected with norovirus 
in early 2009. See http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/petfood.html; 
http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2007/october/100207.html; 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2009/NEW01978.html. 
4 FDA, Peanut Butter and other Peanut Containing Products Recall List, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/peanutbutterrecall/index.cfm (April 23, 2009).  See also   3 
whole  market  is  not  affected,  a  contamination  can  wreak  havoc  on  whole  industries  by 
destroying public confidence in any product with that crop, whether a particular supplier was 
implicated or not. When a consumer has no idea where his food is coming from, is it any wonder 
that he stops eating all spinach, not just spinach from the affected region? 
  However, the dominant reaction to these outbreaks -- a call for more stringent oversight 
of farms and others in the food distribution chain -- threatens not to make much of an impact of 
food safety and damaging an already small demographic in the process: the small family farm.  
Rather than frantically increasing food safety regulation across the board to all food producers, 
legislators and regulators should closely evaluate the potential responses to the food safety crisis 
to ensure that proposals actually would be effective and worth the cost of implementation.  By 
creating a nuanced, tiered response to food safety issues, Congress can reaffirm its commitment 
to  a  national  ideal  of  sustainable  family  farms  while  strengthening  our  country’s  ability  to 
respond to food safety crises.  
  Parts  I  and  II  will  outline  the  two  movements  of  our  current  food  supply  paradigm 
introduced above -- a desire for sustainability and desire for increased safety.
5  Part III will 
examine current proposed responses to the food safety issues in particular. These proposals will 
be evaluated both for their likely success with respect to food safety, and for their effect on 
small, sustainable producers.  The Part also will suggest an additional proposal that an ideal food 
                                                                                                                                                            
FDA, Peanut Product Recalls: Salmonella Typhimurium, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/salmonellatyph.html (April 22, 2009). 
5 A third major critique -- our food supply’s nutritional value and influence over the rising levels 
of obesity in the United States -- will not be discussed thoroughly.  However, this and other 
nutritional concerns roughly fall under the “sustainability” heading insofar as more local, more 
organic foods are generally thought to encourage healthier eating.  Other parts of the obesity 
critique -- from the dominance of fast food to how school cafeterias feed children to the ubiquity 
of supposedly unhealthy corn products as a result of corn subsidies -- fall outside the narrow 
field of food supply chains discussed in this paper.     4 
safety reform bill – one that aims to comprehensively bolster food safety through both regulator 
and consumer enforcement, while also encouraging family farms and other local, sustainable 
producers – would include.  Part IV concludes.   
PART I.  THE DESIRE FOR SUSTAINABLE FOOD 
In  the  decades  leading  up  to  the  current  food  safety  crisis,  Americans  have  clearly 
exhibited their support of the nostalgic ideal of the small family farm.  In recent years, the 
growth  of  local  food  movements,  organic  farming,  and  community  farm  shareholding  has 
revealed strong popular support for food production that remains geographically restricted or that 
has  gone  through  fewer  steps  of  processing  than  much  of  our  food  currently  does.    Even 
Congress has staunchly supported the farmer in his proverbial dell, expressly claiming a policy 
to promote family farming for over thirty years.  It is against this background support for small 
sustainable family farms that any future regulation of farming, even in the name of food safety, 
must be evaluated.  With proper consideration of proposed regulation, fidelity to this ideal can 
match the fervor for safer food systems. 
A.  Public Support for Sustainable, Local Food 
Over the past several years, authors, journalists and activists have disseminated copious 
materials  decrying  conventional  agriculture  as  environmentally  unsound  and  personally 
unhealthy, advocating sustainable local foods. From Michal Pollan’s best-seller The Omnivore’s 
Dilemma
6 to newspaper articles about President Obama’s family’s garden
7 to more industry-
focused newsletters’ articles about “food miles,” which measure how far food has traveled from 
                                                 
6 POLLAN, supra note 1. 
7 See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now In Season?, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2009, 
at BU1.   5 
farm to supermarket,
8 these publications all urge Americans to turn away from their Twinkies 
and instead embrace more traditional foods.   
Such nostalgia for an idyllic agricultural existence, especially in the form of support for 
local farming, is nothing new.
9  However, the dedication and impact of the local and organic 
food  movements  in  recent  years  have  been  a  surprising  shift  away  from  the  increasing 
consolidation of agricultural and food producers in the United States.  Consumers have taken 
notice of those crying out for more virtuous food.   Whole Foods, the largest organic food supply 
store in the country, doubled in size in just four years from 2004 to 2008.
10  Even Wal-Mart has 
been selling organic food since 2006, emphasizing that it supports sustainable agriculture and 
buys from local growers in an effort to conserve energy expended by food transportation and to 
support  American  farming  jobs.
11    Overall,  sales  of  food  products  that  in  some  commit  to 
“natural,” sustainable production is large and growing: sales of all such products “across all retail 
and direct-to-consumer channels grew to approximately $62 billion in 2007, a 10% increase over 
the prior year,”
12 while certified organic foods sales alone were almost $17 billion in 2006.
13  
                                                 
8 Rich Pirog, Food Miles: A Simple Metaphor to Contrast Local and Global Food Systems (Am. 
Dietetic Ass’n Hunger & Envtl. Nutrition Dietetic Prac. Group), Summer 2004. 
9 For example, when adopting language protective of family farms to the 1977 Agriculture Act, it 
was “noncontroversial” for the Senator introducing the amendment to state that protecting family 
farms was “a long standing principle of American domestic policy.” 123 CONG. REC. 16053, 
16286 (1977) (statements of Senators Talmadge and Pearson). See Part I.A.b, infra, at text 
accompanying note 19 - 30. 
10 Whole Foods, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at intro. (Sept. 27, 2008) (letter to 
stakeholders describing the increase of gross sales from $3.86 billion in 2004 to $7.95 billion in 
2008).  Granted, some of that growth is not an increase in market but rather the purchase of 
smaller grocery stores. See id. at 11 - 12 (describing the purchase of Wild Oats, Inc.).  
11 Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Supports Sustainable Agriculture (May 2008 fact sheet), available at 
http://walmartstores.com/download/ 2307.pdf. 
12 Whole Food, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 10, at 4. 
13 Mark Bittman, Eating Food That’s Good For You, Organic or Not, N.Y. Times, March 21, 
2009, at WK3 (citing figures from Organic Trade Association).   6 
Behind the retailers are the food producers “[h]ailing from small vegetable farms, cattle 
ranches  and  grain  farms”  who  provide  the  food  described  in  those  bestseller  books  and 
newspaper articles.
14  Consumers have begun to realize that their desire for less conventional 
food -- whether they are concerned with food being organic, local, “slow,” or sustainable -- 
requires supporting these smaller farming endeavors.  So, in addition to buying local or national 
food in the supermarket, support for local farms sometimes translates into direct involvement 
with  local  food  production.  For  example,  in  the  last  twenty  years,  programs  specifically 
encouraging  local  and  community  farming  have  erupted  across  the  country.    Community 
supported agriculture (CSA) programs, in which community members become shareholders in a 
farm and then receive shares of the crops or livestock raised, grew since their introduction in a 
single community to the United States in 1984 to 761 CSA farms cataloged by USDA in 2001.
15  
By July 2005, USDA’s database consisted of 1,144 CSA farms.
16  
Of course, there has been some push back on local food movements, arguing that they are 
too faddish to last.  In a compelling article for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 
Professor Pierre Desrochers and writer Hiroko Shimizu recently debunked several claims about 
the environmental and economic benefit of buying food locally.
17  Media coverage has begun to 
                                                 
14 The New American Farmer: Profiles of Agricultural Innovation, USDA: Sustainable 
Agriculture Research and Education (2d ed. 2006). 
15 KATHERINE L. ADAM, ATTRA -- NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE INFORMATION 
SERVICE, IP289, COMMUNITY SUPPORTED AGRICULTURE 3 (2006).   
16 Id. at 4. 
17 Pierre Desrochers & Hiroko Shimizu, Yes, We Have No Bananas: A Critique of the “Food 
Miles” Perspective, MERCATUS POLICY SERIES, POLICY PRIMER NO. 8 (October 2008).  Professor 
Desrochers and Shimizu are in good historical company.  Adam Smith argued against 
protectionism and local farming movements in 1776:  
By means of glasses, hotbeds and hotwalls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, 
and very good wine too can be made of them at about 30 times the expense for which at 
least equally good can be brought from foreign countries.  Would it be a reasonable law   7 
equivocate about buying locally, at least exclusively.
18  While many of these critiques have some 
merit, most do not deny that an increase in availability of local foods from small producers can 
be meritorious if not taken to illogical or vastly uneconomical extremes.  And these critiques 
cannot undercut the mere fact that there exists growing popular opinion and popular demand for 
foods  that  are  perceived  to  be  healthier,  more  environmentally  conscious,  and  perhaps  even 
economically patriotic than succumbing to the vast world of mega food producers and imported 
foods.   
B.  Governmental Support of Family Farms 
In conjunction with rising popular support for small farms is Congress’s longstanding 
support for the family farm, with a frequent emphasis on the smaller producer that is reminiscent 
of the prototypical “salt of the earth” farmer.   Since 1977, Congress has affirmed its policy to 
foster the ideal of the idyllic family farm, stating that it “reaffirms the historical policy of the 
United State to foster and encourage the family farm system . . . .  Congress believes that the 
maintenance of the family farm system of agriculture is essential to the social well-being of the 
Nation . . . .”
19  While the language of the statute does not expressly claim allegiance to local, 
sustainable,  or  small-scale  farming,  legislators  certainly  were  concerned  with  protecting  that 
ideal.  In their discussions of the Agriculture Act of 1977, supporting smaller operations was 
certainly on the minds of the legislators debating the statutes provisions.   
                                                                                                                                                            
to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of Claret 
and Burgundy in Scotland? 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS vol. 1, 
chap. II, para. 1221 (1776).  
18 See, e.g., Bittman, supra note 13; C. Claiborne Ray, Q & A -- Salt of the Earth, N.Y. Times, 
April 27, 2009, at D2 (“When you think of the pictures [of people with goiters from a lack of 
iodine] from the Chilean Andes, sticking to eating only local foods seems like not such a good 
idea.” (quoting a food sciences professor at Cornell)).  
19 See Pub. L. 95-113 §102, 91 Stat. 918 (1977) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §2266(a) (2006)).   8 
When he introduced the language quoted above as an amendment to the Agriculture Act 
of 1977, Kansas Senator James B. Pearson stated that the affirmation of the family farm “breaks 
no new ground, declares no new principle . . . .  From the Revolutionary period to the present 
there has been a national judgment to the effect that the family farm system was much preferable 
to other forms of agriculture production units.”
20  The purposive statement was adopted by the 
Senate with no debate and a voice vote, indicating the noncontroversial nature of the claim that 
not only is the family farm system “essential to the social well-being of the Nation,” but that 
“any significant expansion of nonfamily owned large-scale corporate farming enterprises will be 
detrimental to the national welfare.”
21  
Indeed, throughout the debates in both the House and Senate of the 1977 Agriculture Act, 
one could see the influence of the ideal of the small family farm.  In the Senate, when first 
introducing  the  bill  on  May  23,  1977,  Senator  Herman  Talmadge  listed  “permit[ting]  and 
encourag[ing]  the  family  farm  to  grow  and  prosper”  as  one  of  six  main  principles  of  an 
appropriate program for agriculture.
22   The bill adopted a small farm research and extension 
program, intent on encouraging farms with yearly gross sales of less than $20,000.
23  Similarly, 
though a stronger amendment barring corporations from receiving subsidies was not passed, the 
act  as  passed  left  open  the  possibility  that  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  would  deny  paying 
subsidies to corporate farms.
24  Even in rhetoric, the debates referenced their support of the 
family farm: then-Senator Hubert Humphrey referenced the ideal more obliquely in his statement 
of support for the bill and how it dealt with the changing realities of modern agriculture by 
                                                 
20 123 CONG. REC. 16286 (1977) (statement of Senator Pearson). 
21 Pub. L. 95-113 §102, 91 Stat. 918 (1977) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §2266(a) (2006)). 
22 123 CONG. REC. 16038 (1977) (statement of Senator Talmadge). 
23 Pub. L. 95-113 §§1140 - 43 (1977) (codified as amended at 7. U.S.C. §2661 et seq. (2006)). 
24 123 CONG. REC. 24100 - 07 (1977); Pub. L. 95-113 §101 (1977).   9 
comparing a contemporary farmer’s operation with his father’s.
25  Senator Bob Dole voiced his 
support for an amendment involving the regulation of rice primarily by stating that it would 
“open up the possibility for smaller companies and smaller exporters.”
26 
As might be predicted, the rhetoric of the House debates was even more fervent in giving 
homage to that great American trope: the small family farmer.  One Representative read a letter 
from a farmer constituent describing his difficulty of keeping both a car and a pickup truck, his 
tractor’s  need  for  new  tires,  and  that  his  family  could  not  go  on  vacation  that  year.
27    In 
discussing  whether  corporate  farms  would  receive  subsidies,  arguments  against  the  ban  on 
corporate  subsidies  still  championed  the  small,  family-owned  farm,  pointing  out  that  the 
proposed language wouldn’t protect smaller farms from larger family farms, or that partnerships 
of “two families of brothers” each with a small farm would all of a sudden be barred from 
receiving subsidies.
28  One Representative even noted that the small family farmer needed to be 
protected because he held himself to higher environmental standards than the rest of the world’s 
farmers do.
29  Over the several days of debate on the farm bill, not a single congressperson 
favored corporate farming from the floor of debate or suggested that Congress focus more on 
keeping food supplies stable rather than worry about diminishing numbers of family farmers.  
                                                 
25 123 CONG REC. 16065 (1977) (statement of Senator Humphrey). 
26 Id. at 16053 (statement of Senator Dole). 
27 Id. at 24063 (statement of Representative Sebelius). 
28 Id. at 24101, 24103.  See also id. at 24390 (“I share the gentleman’s concern . . . about keeping 
large corporate entities out [of agriculture] since such entities really have no concern for the 
future of agriculture.”) (statement of Representative Krebs regarding loan restrictions for 
corporate farms.) 
29 Id. at 24560 - 61 (discussing the environmental standards that U.S. sugar farmers obey but 
foreign farmers might not, and the need to protect the 15,000 family farmers of sugar crops) 
(statement of Representative Thone).   10 
Instead, discussions of other provisions regarding specific provisions about beets, sugar, and 
grain reserves, all remained protective and laudatory of “our teetering small farmers.”
30   
C.  Reality of American Farming 
What  has  happened  to  that  teetering  small  farmer  in  the  course  of  the  last  century?  
Certainly there are fewer farmers today than our heritage as the world’s bread basket suggests.  
In 1935, the United States boasted almost 7 million farms.
31  By the end of the century, that 
number had shrunk to just 1.9 million.
32  Smaller family farms are particularly vulnerable to 
market pressures.   By 2007, family farms with less than $250,000 in yearly sales accounted for 
90% of U.S. farms, but less than 25% of production.
33  Family farms with less than $100,000 
comprised 84% of farms, and less than 14% of production.
34  The dominance of large farms in 
the supply of food is exacerbated by the fact that about two-fifths of small farms specialize in 
                                                 
30 Id. at 24578 (statement of Representative Leggett).  See also, e.g.,  id. at 24071 (affirming our 
nation’s “very industrious and capable farms and the families” and the “life which the family 
farmer has earned for himself”); id. at 24077 (“We have a long way to go before we will 
establish a national food policy which will . . . be based on the family farm agricultural system 
which as served the Nation and the world for so long.”); id. at 24082 (“On the July 4 break and 
since, I have been spending most of my time at county fairs -- visiting with farmers, small 
businessmen, and farm implement dealers.”); id. at 24091 (“Small farmers and young famers just 
getting started will be hardest hit”); id. at 24098 (in an argument that the small farm definition of 
gross sales of $20,000 was too small, saying “If we accept the $20,000 figure, it sounds as 
though we are supporting small family farmers, but that is not what we are doing. . . . [W]e are 
considering the average farmer today, the farmer who is neither a corporate farmer nor a big 
farmer.”); id. at 24099 (opposing an amendment to provisions about rice, saying “we would be 
hitting the small rice farmer . . . We would not be hurting the big farmers.”); id. at 24378 
(supporting an amendment to provisions affecting sugar producers because it would “benefit the 
small producer of sugar”); id. at 24578 (supporting the federal grain reserve because current 
prices were “seriously threatening the economic survival of many of our small farmers”); id. at 
24584  - 85 (mentioning what one learns “[w]hen one goes around the countryside and listens to 
the farmers”). 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 2001 - 2002 24 & fig. 3-1 (2003) 
[hereinafter AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK]. 
32 Id. 
33 ROBERT A. HOPPE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, STRUCTURE AND FINANCES OF U.S. 
FARMS: FAMILY FARM REPORT, 2007 EDITION, EIB No. 24, iii - iv (June 2007). 
34 Id.   11 
beef  cattle  alone,
35  while  very  large  family  farms  (gross  annual  sales  over  $500,000)  and 
corporate farms produce 78% of the nation’s fruits, vegetables, tree nuts and other high value 
crops.
36   
On top of economic pressures, family farms face regulations that present a large burden 
on their small market shares.  For example, USDA regulation of meat slaughter and processing 
makes  on-farm  processing  almost  impossible  for  a  small  producer.
37    For  those  wanting  to 
capitalize on the rising demand for organic food, certification in order to be allowed to label food 
“organic” requires yearly paying for the travel and per diem expenses of the inspector.
38  Joel 
Salatin, author and owner of a local-market beef, poultry, pork, and rabbit farm in Virginia, put it 
this way:  “But what about dressing a couple of animals a year in the backyard?  How can that be 
compared ton a ConAgra or Tyson facility?  In the eyes of the government, the two are one and 
the  same.  .  .  .    If  society  really  wants  government  certification,  my  little  market  share  will 
continue to deteriorate into oblivion.”
39 
PART II. THE DESIRE FOR SAFER FOOD 
  On  March  14,  2009,  President  Obama  announced  in  his  weekly  address  that  he  was 
creating a Food Safety Working Group to respond to the “troubling trend that’s seen the average 
                                                 
35 AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, supra note 31, at 31 fig. 3-8. 
36 Id. at 10 - 11 & tbl. 2.  
37 Joel Salatin, Everything I want to Do Is Illegal, 33 ACRES: A VOICE FOR ECO-AGRICULTURE 
(Sept. 2003). 
38 See General Accreditation Policies and Procedures, Agricultural Marketing Services, UDSA 
(rev. Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with author); National Organic Program Fact Sheet, Agricultural 
Marketing Services, UDSA (updated April 2008) at 2.  See also Organic Foods Production Act, 
Pub. L. 101-624 § 2101, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq. (2006)).  It is 
worth noting, however, that producers with under $5000 in annual sales can market their 
products as organic without getting certified, as long as they are following the requirements of 
the “organic” label. National Organic Program Fact Sheet, supra, at 1. 
39 Salatin, supra note 37, at 1, 3.   12 
number of outbreaks from contaminated produce and other foods grow to nearly 350 a year – up 
from 100 a year in the early 1990s.”
40  Indeed, the President’s recognition of this trend reflects a 
concern of a wide array of Washington, D.C., officials and increasing concern among the public.  
In December 2004, when he announced his resignation as Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, Tommy Thompson warned: “I, for the life of me, cannot understand why 
the terrorists have not . . . attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.”
41  In January 
2007, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) listed federal food safety programs 
as  having  a  high  risk  of  failure.
42    In  response  to  such  concerns  and  the  myriad  infections 
described  in  the  Introduction  to  this  paper,  during  2008  and  early  2009,  the  U.S.  House  of 
Representatives  held  almost  two  dozen  food  safety  hearings,
43  and  introduced  many  bills  to 
address food safety problems.
44  The concern over food safety has reached popular culture, too, 
from newspaper columns begging for safer foods and changes in factory farm protocol
45 to a 
                                                 
40 Remarks of President Barack Obama, Weekly Address, March 14, 2009, available at Office of 
the Press Secretary, President Barack Obama Announces Key FDA Appointments and Tougher 
Food Safety Measures, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Weekly-Address-President-
Barack-Obama-Announces-Key-FDA-Appointments-and-Tougher-Food-Safety-Measures/ 
[hereinafter Barack Obama, March 14, 2009, Address].  
41 Mike Allen, Rumsfeld to Remain at Pentagon; Thompson Quits HHS, Warn of Vulnerabilities, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1. 
42 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, GAO-07-310, High Risk Series: An Update 69 (Jan. 
2007) [hereinafter GAO, High Risk Series 2007]. 
43 Gardiner Harris, Bipartisan Call for Food Safety Fixes, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2009, at A20. 
44 See Part III, infra. 
45 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Our Pigs, Our Farms, Our Health, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2009, at 
A29; Paula Crossfield, Will Obama's Food Safety Working Group Address MRSA and the 
Deeper Issues Facing the Food System?, Huffington Post, March 15, 2009, at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paula-crossfield/will-obamas-food-safety-w_b_175032.html.   13 
documentary called Food, Inc., that’s already made its way through film festivals and will be 
receiving popular distribution starting in June, 2009.
46  
  It should be noted that our food supply is actually safer than it was during the 1930s 
when farming in the United States was at its peak and remained quite local.  In fact, our food is 
safer than it was even ten years ago, even with all the outbreaks in the news.  Since the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) starting collecting data on foodborne diseases in the 
1996, incidence rates for most pathogens, including salmonella, E.coli, and listeria, appear to 
have actually decreased.
47  The increased media reports of food-related outbreaks stems not from 
increases in outbreaks, but in an increased ability to track outbreaks to a common source.  In the 
past 20 years, increased sophistication of epidemiological models and greater access to national 
databases have significantly improved state and local authorities as well as the CDC and FDA to 
pinpoint the source of a group of food-borne illnesses.
48 
These positive trends do not negate the argument that large vulnerabilities exist in our 
current food safety system.  For one thing, the decreases in foodborne disease rates appears to 
                                                 
46 See Hungry for Change, Food, Inc., http://www.foodincmovie.com/index.php (last visited 
May 10, 2009); Review, Food, Inc., VARIETY, Oct. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117938322.html?categoryid=31&cs=1. The movie outlines 
and criticizes the whole food industry system, but “food safety is a huge part of that discussion.” 
Crossfield, supra note 45.  
47 CDC, Preliminary FoodNet Data on the Incidence of Infection with Pathogens Transmitted 
Commonly Through Food --- 10 States, 2008, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 333,  
335 fig. 2 (2009). However, some diseases have increased, such as campylobacter, a disease 
contracted most often by raw milk or undercooked poultry that causes diarrhea and in rare cases 
an autoimmune nerve disease called Guillain-Barré syndrome. Id.; CDC, Campylobacter General 
Information, http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/dfbmd/disease_listing/campylobacter_gi.html. 
48 See, e.g., Sonja J. Olsen et al., CDC, Surveillance for Food-Borne Disease Outbreaks -- 
United States, 1993 - 1997, 49 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CDC Surveillance 
Study SS-1, 6 - 7 (2000) (stating that “[c]urrent methods to detect [foodborne disease outbreaks] 
are improving” and describing new algorithms and national networks of laboratories that were 
responsible for such improvements).   14 
have plateaued since 2004 or 2005.
49  Additionally, the improvement from the past does not 
undermine the opinions of so many experts and legislators that our current systems may be 
flirting with disaster.   
The vulnerabilities of the U.S. food supply generally are classified under two headings: 
diffused  and  overlapping  authority  creating  inefficiencies,  and  lack  of  funding  and 
comprehensive  authority.      The  history  of  food  safety  regulation  encourages  viewing  the 
weaknesses in these terms, but the history of food production encourages a slightly different 
focus: diffused and overlapping food supply chains creating inefficiencies and untraceability, and 
a lack of diverse sources of food supply methods.  This Part will outline both the traditional 
criticisms of food safety regulation, as well as the more market-driven critiques of food safety. 
A.  Overlapping and Arbitrary Authority 
By far the most repeated criticism of the current federal food safety programs is their 
sprawl across several agencies and safety systems.  In its report adding food safety to a list of 
high risk areas of federal regulation, the GAO noted that “the patchwork nature of the federal 
oversight of food safety calls into question whether the government can plan more strategically 
to  inspect  food  production  processes,  identify  and  react  more  quickly  to  any  outbreaks  of 
contaminated food, and focus on achieving results to promote the safety and the integrity of the 
nation’s food supply.”
50  Specifically, it claimed that this patchwork approach has resulted in 
                                                 
49 CDC, Preliminary FoodNet Data on the Incidence of Infection with Pathogens Transmitted 
Commonly Through Food --- 10 States, 2008, supra note 47, at 336 (Editorial Note). 
50 GAO, High Risk Series 2007, supra note 42, at 69.  The GAO has in fact been criticizing the 
patchwork of food safety programs for years, warning that “[t]he natural inclination to react to 
each event with a patch here and a band-aid there has not proven to be an effective long-term 
solution.” U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, T-RCED-98-24, Food Safety: Fundamental 
Changes Needed to Improve the Nation’s Food Safety System 1 (Oct. 8, 1997) (testimony before 
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S. Senate).  See also U.S. 
Governmental Accountability Office, T-RCED-99-256, Food Safety: U.S. Needs a Single Agency 
to Administer a Unified, Risk-Based Inspection System (Aug. 4, 1999) [hereinafter GAO, Food   15 
thirty  years  of  “inconsistent  oversight,  ineffective  coordination,  and  inefficient  use  of 
resources.”
51 
Many food safety experts agree with the GAO.  In a recent hearing on current food safety 
systems before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, both of the former 
Undersecretaries for Food Safety at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) who testified 
urged the House to consider a consolidated food safety agency, either by creating a new agency 
or by consolidating all food safety programs under the USDA, which currently runs the highly 
successful  Food  Safety  and  Inspection  Service  (FSIS)  with  respect  to  meat  processing  and 
delivery.
52    A  representative  from  the  Food  Policy  Institute  at  the  Consumer  Federation  of 
America,  a  non-profit  association  of  over  300  organizations  representing  a  combined 
membership  of  over  50  million  Americans,  also  expressed  that  organization’s  support  of  “a 
single independent food safety agency that would combine all federal food safety functions.”
53 
The current system of food safety is indeed a patchwork, a haphazard result of piecemeal 
legislation and regulation over the past century.
54  The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906
55 and 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907
56 set the stage for a divided system of food safety by 
                                                                                                                                                            
Safety: U.S. Needs a Single Agency] (testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate). 
51 GAO, High Risk Series 2007, supra note 42, at 69. 
52 Current Food Safety Systems:  Hearing before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 
(April 2, 2009) (testimonies of  Michael R. Taylor and Dr. Elsa A. Murano). 
53 Id. (testimony of Carol L. Tucker-Foreman at 14). 
54 Fragmentation of federal programs is exacerbated by the fact that “literally thousands of state 
and local health and agriculture departments and laboratories play critical frontline roles in the 
nation’s food safety system” through their initial responses to illness outbreaks and their 
regulation of restaurant food safety practices.  Current Food Safety Systems:  Hearing before the 
H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. (April 2, 2009) (Testimony of Michael R. Taylor at 1). 
55 Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938). 
56 Pub. L. No. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§601 - 695 (2006)).   16 
assigning most food safety regulation to the Department of Chemistry (the antecedent to the 
FDA), but removing meat inspection to the Bureau of Animal Industry.  Both organizations 
originally  were  housed  within  the  USDA,  but  in  response  to  fears  that  the  Department  of 
Agriculture was more concerned with the protection of farmers and other food producers than 
with food safety, the FDA was transferred first in 1940 to the Federal Security Agency and then 
in 1953 to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the antecedent to the Department 
of Health and Human Services, where the FDA remains today.   
With  this  auspicious  start,  federal  food  safety  programs  were  divided  from  their 
inception.  Over the next decades the system became even more fragmented.
57  All told, fifteen 
federal agencies now have regulatory responsibilities over some part of food safety: eight USDA 
agencies (including FSIS), FDA, the CDC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National 
Marine Fisheries Service at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau at the Department of Treasury, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the Department of Homeland Security.
58  
Lack of consolidation and coordination in food safety measures is an easy scapegoat – the 
arbitrary  nature  of  which  agency  has  oversight  combined  with  the  very  different  types  of 
responses from each agency is a natural target for those worried about the vulnerabilities of our 
nation’s  food  supply  to  infection  and  contamination.    For  example,  FSIS  daily  inspects 
manufacturers of pizza with meat topping; FDA inspects manufacturers of pizza without meat 
                                                 
57 For example, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 removed pesticide 
regulation to that agency. 
58 U.S. Governmental Accounting Office, GAO-05-212, Food Safety: Experiences of Seven 
Countries in Consolidating Their Food Safety Systems 7 fig. 1(Feb. 2005).   17 
topping approximately once in five years.
59  Such arbitrary division of authority seems ridiculous 
at  best,  and  dangerously  capricious  at  worst.    It  hardly  seems  likely  that  Congress  had  a 
principled reason for authorizing and funding daily inspection of pepperoni pizza manufacturers 
but only twice a decade inspection of cheese pizza manufacturers. 
B.  Lack of Funding and Insufficient Authority 
Lurking behind the complaints of arbitrary divisions of power between agencies is a 
deeper complaint: that of insufficient funding and authority for comprehensive oversight of food 
safety.  Note that the example of the wide disparity between FSIS and FDA inspections above is 
actually a complaint about how little FDA seems to do in comparison to its cousin agency.  Lack 
of funding is a common complaint in government regulation, but it seems particularly cogent in 
the context of FDA food inspection:  while FDA is responsible for the safety of 80% of the 
nation’s food supply, its entire food safety budget in 2007 was only $589 million.
60  In the same 
year, FSIS inspected only meat, poultry, and egg products with a budget of $890 million for just 
inspections.
61  The result is that FDA employs less than one sixth the number of food safety 
inspectors that FSIS does.
62  
                                                 
59 For a representative sample of the strange division of authority between FSIS and FDA, see 
Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1345, 1356 tbl. 1 (2007). 
60 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, GAO 08-1047, Food Safety:  Improvements Needed 
in FDA Oversight of Fresh Produce 53 tbl. 5 (Sept. 2008) [hereinafter GAO, Food Safety: Fresh 
Produce Improvements Needed]  (fiscal year 2007 spending). 
61 FSIS exemplifies growing inadequacy of U.S. food inspection regime, HS DAILY WIRE: THE 
BUSINESS OF HOMELAND SECURITY, March 7, 2008, available at 
http://hsdailywire.com/single.php?id=5715. 
62 In 2003, there were fewer than 1,200 FDA inspectors at the Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition; FSIS employed about 7,400 inspectors the same year.  PETER HUTT, RICHARD 
A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1261 (3d 
ed. 2007).    18 
Even were FDA to receive more authority to inspect food suppliers more stringently, a 
lack of funding means that little implementation could occur, as past experience shows.  The 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
63 gave FDA 
addition authority for protecting the safety of the nation’s food supply, including detaining food 
where there is credible evidence that the product present a serious health threat,
64 requiring food 
facility registration,
65 detaining and increasing regulation and documentation of food imports.
66  
However, though the Act appropriated more money to the FDA for drug safety, there was no 
additional funding for food safety.
67  Therefore, it may come with little surprise that even with 
this enhanced regulatory authority, by March 2009 there was still no official at FDA whose full-
time job is food safety and who has authority over the various strands of food safety programs at 
FDA.
68  In addition, even though a substantial number of the known food safety failures in recent 
years have been related to produce, FDA barely focused any resources on the enforcement of its 
food safety authority on fresh produce-related violations.  Though listing fresh produce as a food 
safety priority since 1997, reiterating that concern in 1999, 2004, and 2006, FDA more than 
halved its fresh produce inspections from 2004 to 2007 and sent only ten fresh produce related 
warning letters between 2002 and 2007 (and none sent after 2004).
69 
                                                 
63 P.L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) (codified at scattered sections of 7, 21, 29, 38, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
64 Id. at §303, 116 Stat 663 - 64 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §334(h)) 
65 Id. at §305, 116 Stat. at 667 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §350(d)). 
66 Id. at §307, 116 Stat. at 670. 
67 Id. at §§ 521 - 523, 116 Stat. 694 - 95. 
68 JEFFERY LEVI, LAURA M. SEGAL, & SERENA VINTER, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, 
KEEPING AMERICA’S FOOD SAFE: A BLUEPRINT FOR FIXING THE FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM AT THE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 5 (March 2009). 
69 GAO, Food Safety: Fresh Produce Improvements Needed, supra note 60, at 11 - 12, 25 - 27 & 
figs. 5, 7.   19 
With regards to deficiencies in substantive authority, commentators have noted that FDA 
can only detain food in a noncompliant factory, whereas FSIS can “effectively shut down” a 
noncompliant food processing establishment under its authority.
70  Others have complained that 
neither FSIS nor FDA have mandatory recall capacity.
71  Still other critics point out that agencies 
fail to use either comprehensive or robust science-based risk analysis.
72  Finally, some recognize 
weaknesses  stemming  from  agencies’  inconsistent  ability  to  trace  products  back  through  the 
supply chain because regulations only require companies to keep records one step back in the 
food chain.
73 
All of these substantive deficiencies are certainly areas in which increase authority and 
enforcement would help address food safety issues.  However, without a substantial increase in 
funding  to  administer  more  thorough  regulation,  it  is  doubtful  that  more  authority  would 
necessarily result in more enforcement. By the time that legislators began seriously investigating 
food safety after the recent infections of spinach, peppers, and peanuts, congressmen and women 
expressed outrage that FDA did not spend (or have) more money for food safety and inspection.  
As one Representative dramatically opined, “As a result of the failure of giving Food and Drug 
the resources it needs, . . . people are dying.”
74 
C.  Overlapping and Confusing Supply Chains 
                                                 
70 Note, Reforming the Food Safety System, supra note 59, at 1355 - 56 (citing GAO reports). 
71 See Current Food Safety Systems:  Hearing before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 
(April 2, 2009) (testimony of Michael R. Taylor at 3,6; testimony of Carol L. Tucker-Forman at 
9 - 10). 
72 See, e.g., GAO, Food Safety: Fresh Produce Improvements Needed, supra note 60, at 22. 
73 See, e.g., Testimony of Jean Halloran, Director, Food Policy Initiatives Consumers Union, to 
the H. Subcomm. on Horticulture and Organic Agriculture (July 30, 2008), at 4 - 6, available at 
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h90729b/Halloran.doc. 
74 Harris, Bipartisan Call for Food Safety Fixes, supra note 43 (quoting Representative John D. 
Dingell, Democrat of Michigan).   20 
Most attention to the problem of food safety stops at the two analyses above.  While 
focusing on governmental sources of food safety issues may be understandable from the point of 
view of legislators and the GAO reporting to those legislators, it presents an incomplete picture.  
And while the historical accident of divided agency authority and huge divergences in funding of 
those agencies may be sources of some inefficiency, they are not the only problems.  Solving 
those problems is an incomplete solution.   
Frozen and prepared foods go through an increasing number of steps from the soil to the 
table.  Highly processed foods sometimes include ingredients not derived from a farm but from 
mines  or  labs.
75    As  food  supply  chains  become  more  interconnected  and  international,  the 
potential  points  of  contamination  increase.  In  addition,  as  supply  chains  become  evermore 
muddled, tracking the source of a contamination becomes almost impossible in the timeframe 
required by a sudden crisis.  The 2008 salmonella saintpaul infection of jalapeño peppers (and 
possibly tomatoes) serves an excellent example.   
In June 2008, FDA issued a warning to consumers in New Mexico and Texas not to eat 
certain types of red tomatoes, followed shortly by a nationwide warning.
76  However, by late 
June, FDA had reason to believe jalapeño peppers, not tomatoes were the culprit.
77  Then, on 
July  7,  multivariate  analysis  of  the  outbreak  suggested  that  at  least  some  illnesses  were 
                                                 
75 See generally STEVE ETTLINGER, TWINKIE, DECONSTRUCTED (2007) (mapping all the chemical 
ingredients of the Twinkie, such as polysorbate 60, which is derived from a series of chemical 
reactions of corn syrup, palm oil and petroleum). 
76 Press Release, FDA, FDA Warns Consumers in New Mexico and Texas Not to Eat Certain 
Types of Raw Red Tomatoes (June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/NEW01843.html; Press Release, FDA, FDA Warns 
Consumers Nationwide Not to Eat Certain Types of Raw Red Tomatoes (June 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/NEW01848.html. 
77 CDC, Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Saintpaul Infections Associated with Multiple Raw 
Produce Items --  United States, 2008, 57 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 929, 931 - 32 
(2008).   21 
associated with guacamole that did not have jalapeño peppers in it.
78  Ten days later, FDA lifted 
the tomato warning, and shifting its focus to jalapeño and serrano peppers.
79  By the end of 
August, after over 1,400 people had gotten sick from salmonella saintpaul, the CDC issued in its 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report that there was no evidence that tomatoes had ever been 
involved in the outbreak, though jalapeño peppers from certain Mexican farms (some of which 
also grew Roma tomatoes) were identified as infected.
80   
On July 30, 2008, toward the end of the outbreak, the FDA published a partial schematic 
of the traceback in which it engaged to find which farms and crops it should test for salmonella 
saintpaul infection.
81  As the schematic revealed, finding a single source from a web of mixing 
and remixing of crops and products from farm to packagers to repackagers to restaurants to 
consumers proved a task of Gordian knot proportions.  For example, in tracing back a tomato, 
the original suspected source of contamination, FDA officials would have likely gone through a 
consumer to a restaurant or grocery store, to a processing plant, to a repackaging and distribution 
operation, to a packing house, back to the field.
82  At every step of the way, tomatoes from 
different sources would be intermingled, along with any other crops packaged or processed at the 
same time.
 83  As noted by the Director of Food Policy Initiatives at the Consumers Union, the 
                                                 
78 Id. at 932. 
79 Press Release, FDA, FDA Lifts Warning About Eating Certain Types of Tomatoes (July 17, 
2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/NEW01862.html.  
80 CDC, Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Saintpaul Infections Associated with Multiple Raw 
Produce Items -- United States, 2008, supra note 77, at 933. 
81 FDA, Salmonella Saintpaul Outbreak Traceback & Distribution: Partial View of the 
Traceback & Distribution of Peppers from Mexico: July 16 -- July 30, 3008 (July 30, 2008), 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/salmonellatraceback.pdf. 
82 See UNITED FRESH PRODUCE ASSOCIATION, COMMODITY SPECIFIC FOOD SAFETY GUIDELINES 
FOR THE FRESH TOMATO SUPPLY CHAIN 2 fig. 1 (2d. ed, 2008). 
83 Testimony of Jean Halloran, supra note 73, at 3.   22 
publisher of Consumer Reports, with respect to tomatoes and peppers and similar produce, “we 
have very limited traceability for food.”
84  The lack of sound epidemiological evidence, as well 
as a confused supply chain to the Mexican restaurants that were the known sources of infection, 
prevented FDA and CDC from identifying which crops or products were actually the cause of 
the outbreak until the outbreak may have already crested.
85   
When tracking contamination becomes too difficult to accomplish quickly, the resulting 
broad recalls and widespread but vague media speculation can do tremendous damage not just to 
the producers and suppliers whose food was contaminated.  The events of the 2008 salmonella 
infection exhibit the sort of unfounded accusation that can result from the pressure to find a 
culprit quickly.  Similarly, during the 2006 salmonella contamination of spinach, products were 
indiscriminately  destroyed  or  taken  off  store  shelves,  creating  an  impression  that  the  entire 
nation’s spinach crop was potentially dangerous.  A whole season’s crop was destroyed, even 
though later examination showed that “the only contaminated product came from one 50-acre 
farm, packaged in one processing plant and only on one production shift.”
86  Three years later, 
spinach sales continue to suffer, even though the threat has been eliminated. 
87 
D.  Lack of Market Diversity 
                                                 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 See CDC, Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Saintpaul Infections Associated with Multiple Raw 
Produce Items -- United States, 2008, supra note 77, at 931 fig. 2 (showing that the FDA tomato 
warning was not issued until just during or after the peak of infections (though if tomatoes were 
involved, then the warning may have actually caused the subsequent decline in infection rates), 
and that the July 9, 2008 pepper warning -- the only warning now known to implicate the proper 
crops -- was issued well after the natural peak of the outbreak).  
86 Harris, Bipartisan Call for Food Safety Fixes, supra note 43 (quoting Thomas E. Stenzel, chief 
executive of the United Fresh Produce Association). 
87 Id.   23 
Counterbalancing  the  interconnected  and  increasingly  global  supply  chain  described 
above is a lack of market diversity that often occurs at some point in the food supply chain.  This 
final food safety weakness affects the scope of an outbreak, rather than the absolute danger of an 
outbreak or the ability to identify its source.  While the economies of scale present in large food 
producing and processing operations can deliver a boon to consumers in the form of lower prices 
and more predictable quality, a single source of contamination can result in nationwide or even 
global impact. 
Farm production in the United States has been consolidating. In the beef industry, for 
example, the top four beef packers control 80% of the market, compared to less than 25% in the 
1970s.
 88  And while in the 1970s, thousands of slaughterhouses processed the majority of beef, 
today only thirteen control over half the market.
89 The rest of the world follows this pattern as 
well.    In  1950,  two  thirds  of  the  world’s  economically  active  population  were  farmers  or 
otherwise involved in agriculture.
90  By 1997, that ratio was under half.
91  While that may seem 
like a large portion of the world’s population, many of those farmers still engage in subsistence 
farming in sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia, and other areas with almost no influence on a global 
market.
92    Those  farmers  who  do  produce  more  than  their  own  necessity,  therefore,  often 
produce large slices of the production pie.  
Other  consolidations  of  production  and  distribution  can  turn  intermingle  smaller 
producers’ crops, cross-contaminating food and distributing disease far beyond the reach of a 
                                                 
88 Participant Media and River Road Entertainment, Press Materials for Food, Inc., at 7 (2008) 
(listing data from the research in the film). 
89 Id. 
90 Louis A. Ferleger, A World of Farmers, But Not a Farmer’s World, 2 J. Hist. Soc’y 43, 46 tbl. 
1 (2002). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 51.   24 
single farm. The recent peanut product recall reveal what can happen when a single processing 
plant contaminates is product.  The Peanut Corporation of America, based in Blakely, Georgia, 
processed about 2.5% of the country’s peanuts.
93  That single processor therefore infected a 
statistically substantial portion of a ubiquitous food, and wreaked havoc.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, almost 4,000 types of products were affected and recalled by downstream food 
producers. And just three weeks after the initial recall by the Peanut Corporation of America, 
sales of all peanut butter -- including unaffected brands -- were down 25%.
94  
Both the consolidation of producers and the increasing complexity of food supply and 
distribution chains have created a perfect storm of vulnerability.  As the Vice President of Food 
Safety of one of the largest grocery chains in the United States noted in his testimony before the 
House Committee on Agriculture in April 2009: “[A] few lots of a raw agricultural commodity 
when used as an ingredient in other products can contaminate hundreds of products representing 
millions of pounds of food.”
95  
PART III.  PROPOSED FOOD SAFETY LEGISLATION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SUSTAINABLE 
FAMILY FARM 
With  this  background  understanding  both  of  the  desirability  of  small  farms  with  a 
capacity to sell locally and of the present criticisms of national food safety, we now turn to what 
federal legislators in particular are proposing for the future of food safety programs.  Since the 
                                                 
93 Dan Chapman & Margaret Newkirk, Blakely Plant Part of Firm With Humble Start: Company 
of Hardworking Lynchburg, Va., CEO Has Faced Trouble Before, The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, Feb. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.ajc.com/services/content/news/stories/2009/02/08/peanutcorp0208.html. 
94 Brett J. Blackledge & Ricardo Alonso-Zalvidar, FDA: Plant Knew Peanuts Laced With 
Salmonella, ABCNews (Feb. 7, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/WireStory?id=6825713. 
95 Current Food Safety Systems:  Hearing before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 
(April 2, 2009) (testimony of John H. Hanlin, V.P. Food Safety, SUPERVALU, Inc.)   25 
2008 elections, several bills have been introduced in Congress to address food safety,
96 and the 
President himself has established a Food Safety Working Group.
97  The concern over food safety 
is certainly not new -- for example, at least nineteen distinct bills specifically concerned with 
improving  food  safety  were  introduced  in  Congress  during  the  George  W.  Bush 
Administration.
98  However, in the present political climate, several bills are getting significant 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.759, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (giving additional mandates and increased authority to the FDA regarding 
increased food safety inspection especially with regards to imported foods and raw agricultural 
foods that have been implicated in recent disease outbreaks); H.R. 814, 111th Cong. (2009) (to 
establish a tracing system of foods for FDA and FSIS); H.R.815, 111th Cong. (2009) (to increase 
enforceability of FDA and FSIS authority);  S. 425, 11th Cong. (2009) (doing basically the same 
as H.R. 814 & H.R. 815). 
97 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
98 These bills ranged from anti-terrorist food safety measures, to establishing a new agency of 
Food Safety Administration, to creating user fee food safety systems for food producers similar 
to those for drugs, to changing labeling and requiring the FDA to establish tolerance levels for 
contaminants in foods (which it already does for many foods).  See FDA Food Safety 
Modernization Act, S. 3385 & H.R. 7143, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); Improving Food-borne 
Illness Surveillance and Response Act of 2008, S. 3358, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); Safe 
FEAST Act of 2008, H.R. 5904, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); Keeping America's Food Safe Act 
of 2008, H.R. 5827, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); Consumer Food Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 
3624, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Human and Pet Food Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 2108 & S . 
1274, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Food and Drug Import Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 3610, 110th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Safe Food Act of 2007, S. 654, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Ending 
Agricultural Threats: Safeguarding America’s Food for Everyone (EAT SAFE) Act of 2007, S. 
2418, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Food Safety Authority Modernization Act, S. 2245, 110th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Imported Food Security Act of 2007, S. 1776, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2007); Safe Food Act of 2005, S. 729 & H.R. 1507, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); National 
Uniform Food Safety Labeling Act, H.R. 2235, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Consumer Food 
Safety Act of 2005, H.R. 2236, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (essentially identical to the 
Consumer Food Safety Act of 2007 and introduced by the same Representative); Safe and Secure 
Food Act of 2005, S. 1534, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); H.R. 4167 & S. 3128, 109th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2005) (National Uniformity for Food Act of 2005); Safe Food Act of 2004, H.R. 5259, 
108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) (same as Safe Food Act of 2005, supra); National Uniform Food 
Safety Labeling Act, H.R. 1495, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (same as H.R. 2235, 109th Cong., 
supra); Consumer Food Safety Act of 2003, H.R. 1496, 108th Cong. (1st Sess.2003) (same as 
Consumer Food Safety Act of 2005); National Uniformity for Food Act of 2003, H.R. 2699, 
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); Protecting the Food Supply from Bioterrorism Act, S. 1551 & 
H.R. 3184, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); National Uniformity for Food Act of 2001, H.R. 2649, 
107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (same as National Uniformity for Food Act of 2003, supra); 
Imported Food Safety Act of 2001, H.R. 3075, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); Safe Food Act of 
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attention,  such  as  the  Food  Safety  Modernization  Act  of  2009,
99  which  has  a  considerable 
amount of support
100 as well as media attention.
101  This attention added to the support of the 
President to develop new food safety solutions, some real change in food safety legislation may 
be on the horizon, making an examination of the different types of suggested reform especially 
pertinent.  This Part will briefly outline the components of the proposed bills and critique the 
potential effect of such legislation to both food safety and the long-standing policy in support of 
family farms. 
A.  Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009 and Other Bills 
Because  FSMA  has  gotten  the  most  media  attention,  we  will  start  there.    The  Act 
proposes several major reforms. First, it would establish a Food Safety Administration (FSA), 
removing  the  FDA’s  and  NOAA’s  (but  not  USDA’s)  food  regulation  authority  to  this  new 
agency.  The FDA would be renamed the Federal Drug and Device Administration.
102  Second, 
the FSA would be responsible for establishing “performance standards that define, with respect 
                                                                                                                                                            
Safety Labeling Act, H.R. 1816, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (same as H.R. 1495, 108th Cong., 
supra) ; Consumer Food Safety Act of 2001, H.R. 1817, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) 
(essentially the same as Consumer Food Safety Act of 2003, supra). 
99 H.R. 875, 111th Cong. (2009).  
100 I am measuring support mostly by number of cosponsors of the bill; the Food Safety 
Modernization Act has 41 co-sponsors, more than a third more than the next most supported bill, 
the Safe Food Enforcement, Assessment, Standards, and Targeting (Safe FEAST) Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1332, 111th Cong. (2009).   
101 See Ryan Grim, “HR 875” Myth Sows Terror Among Organic Gardeners, Huffington Post 
(April 15, 2009), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/09/hr-875-myth-sows-terror-
a_n_185230.html (“H.R. 875, the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, has become an 
Internet phenomenon . . . .”); Leah Zerbe, Food Safety Bills Could Hurt Organic Farmers, 
RODALE NEWS, March 20, 2009, at http://www.rodale.com/organic-and-food-safety-bills (Of the 
food safety bills introduced in February and March 2009, “H.R. 875 . . . is getting the most 
attention”).  For examples of that coverage, see, for example, Harris, supra note 43; Times Wire 
Services, Food Safety Revamp Urged, Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2009, at 
http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-sci-cdc10-2009apr10,0,7042234.story. 
102 H.R. 875, 111th Cong. § 101 - 102 (2009).   27 
to specific foods and contaminants in food, the level of food safety performance that a person 
responsible for producing, processing, or selling food shall meet.”
103  Third, there would be 
heightened scrutiny of food-producing and processing facilities.  Any factory, warehouse, or 
facility that processes, stores, or transports food or food ingredients would be required to register 
annually (rather than just once, as is current practice
104) and submit to inspections ranging from 
daily to yearly depending on the type of facility.
 105  The FSA would have the authority to inspect 
farms both in the United States and abroad, and would be required to establish “science-based 
minimum standards for the safe production of food” by farms.
106  Foreign facilities and farms 
would be required to be certified as well as comply with the above regulations.
107  Fourth, the 
FDA would establish a “national traceability system that enables the Administrator to retrieve 
the history, use and location of an article of food through all states of its production, processing, 
and distribution.”
108  The Act also calls for increased use and improvement of epidemiological 
analysis, and provides for increased research on how to improve sanitation and food safety.
109  
Finally, the Act would give the FSA the full authority to detain and seize any food that the FSA 
has reason to believe “fails to meet the requirements of the food safety law,” as well as full 
mandatory recall authority.
110 
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Other bills propose similar solutions, though sometimes in different combinations.  A bill 
introduced  the  day  before  the  FSMA  simply  gave  the  Secretary  of  HHS  the  authority  of 
mandatory  recall  over  food  regulated  by  the  FDA,  as  well  as  calling  for  a  study  on  the 
effectiveness of both voluntary and mandatory recalls.
111 Another addresses primarily issues of 
smuggled food.
112  Yet another bill, the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 
2009, would require annual registration of processing and packaging facilities and accreditation 
of foreign facilities similar to FSMA,
113 but does not discuss increased inspection of farms or 
give the FDA mandatory recall power.  Nor does the bill prescribe inspection frequency based on 
type of facility as FSMA does.  Rather, it requires the FDA to establish a risk-based inspection 
schedule for each facility based on the history of the individual facility in addition to the type of 
food and facility.
114  The bill would also require more documentation for traceback from farms 
and  restaurants  rather  than  increased  inspection  of  farms,
115  and  require  country  of  origin 
labeling of each ingredient in a food.
116   
The Safe FEAST Act of 2009, another bill introduced in the House, gives mandatory 
recall authority and specifically calls for regulations to “minimize the risk of serious adverse 
health  consequences”  of  fruits  and  vegetables.
117    The  Act  relies  on  both  the  FDA  and  the 
facilities  themselves  to  conduct  hazard  analysis,  though,  and  calls  for  a  pilot  program  in 
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2009, S. 429, 11th Cong. (2009) (the bill also calls for increased publicity on HHS and FDA 
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113 H.R. 759, 111th Cong. §§101, 109 (2009). 
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increased traceback and recordkeeping,
118 and in fact requiring that traceback requirements be 
“applicable and appropriate for small businesses.”
119  As with the Food and Drug Administration 
Globalization Act, the Safe FEAST Act gives increased authority for fee collection and gives 
FDA authority to require accreditation of producers of imported food. 
Overall, these bills’ proposals can be grouped in five categories:   
1) creating a new agency or consolidating agency authority;  
2) establishing standards of food safety procedures;  
3) increasing registration requirements and/or inspections for facilities, farms, or both;  
4) increased traceback and recordkeeping capabilities;  
5) and increased enforcement capabilities of the regulatory agency.  
The first category is, by itself, unnecessary at best and debilitatingly harmful to other reforms at 
worst.    The  middle  three  are  potentially  useful  reforms,  but  current  proposals  vary  in  their 
practicality, and some proposals are so broad as to be potentially unmanageable from a food 
safety standpoint and harmful to small family farms as well.  The last category, like the first, 
probably cannot do much by itself, though in combination with the middle three it could either 
help or harm each concern:  public health and food producers. 
B.  Consolidated Power Does Little to Solve the Problem 
As noted above in Part II.A, lack of consolidation has generally served as the largest 
target of food safety critiques. Yet this easy target is not the most important target.  While 
streamlining food safety systems into one authority may help with some issues of inefficiency or 
overlapping authority resulting in a lack of accountability, attacks on divided jurisdiction often 
fail to realize that the problem isn’t the divided efforts, but how different those efforts are.  If 
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FDA and FSIS monitored different farms, but monitored them with the same frequencies and 
same standards, the problem of relatively arbitrary jurisdiction wouldn’t really matter.  As one 
commenter on the food safety system astutely noted, “interagency inconsistencies are harmful 
only  if  one  or  more  of  the  inconsistent  approaches  or  enforcement  procedures  at  issue  are 
themselves insufficient.”
120  Indeed, in its criticism of food safety in 2007, the GAO argued that 
the source of the system’s problems was “inconsistent oversight” and “ineffective coordination” 
between agencies, but then pointed to only one problem actually created by divided authority: 
weaknesses in the flow of information between agencies.  The rest of the GAO’s list focused on 
the substance of agencies’ authority, from recall power to a lack of federal mandate dictating the 
frequency of FDA inspections.
121   
Consolidating  power  is  a  superficial  fix,  which  may  make  the  regulatory  landscape 
neater, but not necessarily more effective.  While experts have called for such a reform,
122 it does 
not address the real underlying problems based in the substance of agency authority and action.  
Consolidation cannot fix a large portion of the “ineffective coordination” problem noted by the 
GAO: a new Food Safety Administration could eliminated coordination between FSIS and FDA, 
but  unless  trackback  capabilities  were  given  completely  to  the  FSA,  there  would  still  be 
coordination with CDC and state and local authorities.  And if trackback capabilities did rest 
solely in FSA, there would be new coordination problems of who gets authority of what reports 
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Single Agency, supra note 50 (arguing that fragmentation leads to poor oversight, but pointing 
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122 GAO, High Risk Series 2007, supra note 42, at 69; GAO, Food Safety: U.S. Needs a Single 
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of illnesses when, which seems a much more difficult real-time evaluation to make than whether 
a facility belongs under FDA or USDA’s authority, or how FDA should interact with other 
agencies as they work through trackback procedures.   
As for how a new agency would affect local farming and the small business concerns of 
American  agriculture,  consolidation  or  creation  of  a  new  agency  seems  like  it  would  have 
minimal effect.  While consolidation might mean some farmers would need to interact with 
fewer agencies, most farmers do not have a wide variety of products.  Instead, over half of small 
and medium sized family farms raise just one commodity, and over 90% raise three or fewer 
commodities.
123  And it is possible that even diversified farms still raise commodities currently 
under  a  single  agency’s  authority.    The  USDA’s  classification  of  “commodity”  separates 
products among twenty-six commodity groups, twenty of which are now under FDA’s food 
safety  authority.
124    Therefore,  consolidation  by  itself  probably  wouldn’t  make  much  of  a 
difference, other than costs of transition from the current system and agency to a new one. 
The only current bill calling for a new agency, FSMA, doesn’t even do a good job of this 
type of reform.  Unlike proposals in the past to create a Food Safety Administration,
125 the 
FSMA doesn’t include the food safety regimes of the USDA in the new agency, and so simply 
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124 Id. at 10 tbl. 2. 
125 See, e.g., Safe Food Act of 2007, S. 654, 110th Congress (2007).    32 
creates yet another agency without any benefits of consolidating authority and expertise.  The 
purpose behind making the FSA in the FSMA seems merely to be a slap on the wrist (or in the 
face) of FDA, taking away power because FDA has not appeared to do its job appropriately, 
even though most deficiencies can be seen as caused by a lack of resources or Congressional 
mandate.  This type of proposal would not do much actual good, and serves merely to distract 
from the substantive issues of who to regulate, when, how and how much. 
C.  Science Does Not Yet Exist For Comprehensive Science-Based Risk Assessments 
The  second  category  of  reform  –  “science-based”  standards  –  is  a  good  idea,  but 
proposed legislative dictates are more aspirational than prescriptive.  Congress can pass laws 
demanding  “science-based”  standards  all  they  want,  but  until  the  science  exists,  food  safety 
regulation will continue to have holes in the context of appropriate risk analysis and safety 
standards.   
Before  describing  current  proposals,  FDA’s  current  practices  regarding  food  safety 
deserve some defense in the face of accusations that their current practices are not already the 
result of scientific and economic calculation.  FDA already uses available methods and research 
to  inform  regulatory  decisions  and  in  making  decisions  about  where  to  place  its  limited 
resources.
126  That the FDA has so few food inspectors is not necessarily a failure on the part of 
the agency, but a calculated decision of what sort of products need extensive oversight.  Meats, 
poultry, and eggs have historically carried far more diseases than other types of food, so it makes 
sense  that  those  foods  have  received  far  more  oversight.    By  contrast,  produce  is  still 
overwhelmingly safe.  Over a billion servings of fresh produce are eaten every day, but even the 
widest outbreaks of produce-carried diseases are on the scale of just hundreds of sickness over 
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several months.
127  The rates of non-meat foodborne illnesses are quite low, on the order of at 
most one sickness in 100,000 servings of produce and one death in 300,000,000.
128  The current 
lack of inspection seems not a rejection of science and standards by the FDA, but an embrace of 
them in the face of limited resources and needing to make decisions of what more a result of 
limited resources combined with a very calculated understanding of what risks are inherent in 
non-meat foods. 
An  important  caveat  to  any  legislation  that  requires  scientific  risk  analysis  and  food 
safety standards is that science does not necessarily reveal an obvious answer to what level of 
regulation is appropriate.  In the case of the safety of fresh produce, new legislation may not be 
the missing ingredient in making FDA’s efforts more effective.  Instead, “[g]aps in scientific 
knowledge have impeded FDA’s efforts to integrate science and risk analysis into its oversight of 
fresh produce safety.”
129  FDA already uses science when available, but those gaps prevent the 
agency from making standards where there would be no principled scientific way of making 
decisions on how to regulate fresh produce. “For example, cattle are known carriers of E. coli 
O157:H7, but scientists do not know exactly how E. coli is passed from animals to produce, and 
thus cannot say how far cattle should be kept from a leafy greens field.”
130  It is to increased 
science, not to increased congressional mandates, that we should look for answers. 
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country each day); Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t 
Enough?, supra note 59, at 1345 (noting that 2006 E. coli contamination of spinach ‘result[ed] in 
three deaths and more than 200 illnesses”).  
128 See Appendix, infra, at tbl. 2. 
129 GAO, Food Safety: Fresh Produce Improvements Needed, supra note 60, at 22. 
130 Id.   34 
Recently developed hazard analysis procedures in the meat industry seem to have been 
tremendously  successful  promoting  scientific  research  as  part  of  the  process  of  developing 
standards.
131  In 1996, FSIS introduced a new rule for food safety regulation of meat and poultry 
slaughterhouses and processing plants called the Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point rule (HACCP).
132  The major components of the HACCP program “require 
that each establishment develop and implement written sanitation standard operating procedures” 
and “implement a system of preventive controls” in addition to establishing general performance 
standards for salmonella for all slaughterhouses and facilities producing raw ground meat and 
requiring regular microbial testing by slaughterhouses.
133   
This hybrid system of both agency imposed standards and facility developed standards 
has served FSIS well because it interacts with market-based issues and incentives of food safety, 
not just the oft-cited regulatory concerns of myriad but insufficient authority and insufficient 
funding.
134  HACCP capitalizes on market incentives to spur quick innovation in techniques such 
as  beef  carcass  steam  pasteurization  and  new  sampling  and  testing  protocols  for  microbial 
pathogen control in hamburger patties.
135  Regulatory standards establish Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMPs) and the government conducts and supports research, but the HACCP system 
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can  also  harness  the  power  of  the  market  to  encourage  improvements  by  strengthening 
accountability and increasing the costs of failure and the benefits of success through increased 
labeling  to  consumers,  recall  power,  inspection  schedules  linked  to  past  performance,  and 
preference in government procurement programs for producers of exceptionally safe products.
136 
With respect to the family farm, more thorough and rigorous food safety standards will 
certainly impose costs.  Legislators imposing changes in food safety procedures should give 
regulators the ability to rigorously analyze costs and benefits before imposing such costs on 
small farms that have little room for overhead costs.  The average small family farm makes less 
than $10,000 net income per year; medium sales farms (between $100,000 and $250,000 in gross 
sales) average $39,084 net income.  The average small or medium farm also operates with a 
profit  margin  of  about  –30  to  –40%.
137    This  means  family  farms  can  ill  afford  significant 
additional costs to their operations.  The government should respect the situation of such farmers 
by not imposing standards without significant data indicating that such standards would actually 
be cost effective.  One of the main advantages of the HACCP system from the perspective of the 
family farm is that the HACCP system encourages the most research and development from the 
largest firms, which have the most to gain from appropriating some slight market advantage.
138 
Smaller firms benefit from diffusion of such innovation, but do not bear the burden of significant 
costs in a food safety measure before it is tested and its cost minimized by the larger firm 
innovators. If the same principles applied to crop and produce production, large farms would 
work with FDA to develop comprehensive safety programs for themselves, especially if their 
products were properly traceable in downstream markets to make their safety efforts worthwhile.  
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Smaller farms would also participate, but to a smaller degree befitting their smaller market share 
and weaker ability to spend money on research and development of safety protocols.  
Comparing  this  type  of  program  to  the  current  legislative  proposals,  most  statutory 
language could encompass a similar approach to produce and other crops.  FMSA is one of the 
weaker texts in this respect because focuses on the creation of general standards rather than in 
creating a system to encourage market development.
139  Three bills – the Senate’s FDA Food 
Safety Modernization Act,
140 the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2009,
141 
and the Safe FEAST Act of 2009
142 – are much closer to the HACCP system and specifically call 
for  facility  driven  hazard  analysis  in  addition  to  broad  safety  standards  promulgated  by  the 
FDA.
143  The FDA Globalization Act also specifically provides for government research, which 
could also benefit smaller farms that cannot conduct their own research in addition to supplying 
another potential source of breakthroughs in developing safer food protocols.
 144 
D.  Increased Oversight Could Help or Hurt Agricultural Industry and Public Health  
Increased registration, certification, and inspection generally address the concern that 
food safety vulnerability stems from a lack of authority and funding of federal agencies, as 
discussed in Part II.B above.  Current proposals vary tremendously on how much additional 
oversight is desirable.  FSMA is on the more prescriptive side of scale, suggesting exactly how 
often processing and packaging facilities should be inspected,
145 and outlining how the FSA 
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would establish what amount to Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs, similar to GMPs), frequent 
inspections, and information collection from farms.
146  Other bills focus more than FSMA does 
on facility registration and certification.
147  Several call for more inspection, and with the 
exception of FSMA, they generally specify that the history of the facility will determine the 
inspection frequency.
148 
Most of the increased inspections and costs are focused on processors, packagers, and 
handlers, rather than farms, so many of these reforms would not directly affect family farms.  
However, if such increases in regulation did branch out to farms, a one-size-fits-all approach to 
inspection like that of FSMA would not bode well for smaller farms as they would have 
increased costs of registration and inspection that could be disproportionate to both their track 
record and to their impact on the market. 
The main issue of such programs is the cost of such programs.  Some bills establish user 
fees,
149 which might hurt smaller farms.  As noted by Joel Salatin, the Viginian farmed quoted in 
Part I.C, small farms often are already wavering between of profitability and an inability to 
remain operating.
150  But even such fees would not cover the whole governmental cost of 
                                                 
146 Id. at §206. 
147 See, e.g., H.R. 759 §§101, 109 (facility registration and certification, respectively);  H.R. 
1332 §101–102, 301(dealing with facility registration and foreign supplier verification).  See also 
Keeping America’s Food Safe Act of 2009, H.R. 999, 111th Cong. §2,3 (2009) (dealing with 
certification for importers and food safety laboratories for imported food). 
148 Compare H.R. 1332 §107 (targeting inspection resources based on the risk profile of the food 
as well as the “facility’s history of food recalls, outbreaks, and violations of food safety 
standards) and S. 510 §210 (same) and H.R. 759 §105 (same) with H.R. 875 §205 
(distinguishing only between the type of food processed at a facility rather than between the 
individual facilities). 
149 E.g., H.R. 759 §101 (establishing facility registration fees); S. 510 §107 (same). 
150 Salatin, supra note 37.  However, given the high proportion of beef cattle farms among small 
farms, see AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, supra note 31, at 31 fig. 3-8, it does seem that at least 
some commodities can defray the cost of inspection for small farms.   38 
comprehensive programs.  The cost of increasing the level of inspection to something similar to 
the FSIS regime would mean multiplying the budget currently used for food inspection five or 
six fold.
151 With the strains of increased costs on both the facilities and government, overly broad 
mandates to increased registration and inspection could be an inefficient use of resources that 
actually harms public safety by diverting both facility and government resources that could be 
productive in other more cost effective measures (such as the tracking systems discussed below).  
In the current economy, the desirability of wise spending becomes even more potent.  By 
focusing on registration and inspection, such proposals overlook the market problems of the food 
safety system and risk and therefore fail to use the market to the advantage of food safety, as in 
HACCP programs and traceability proposals. 
E.  Increased Tracking Can Encourage Food Safety Enforcement from both Regulators 
and Consumers 
Increased tracking is one of the best proposals included in the current crop of food safety 
bills, if technology will permit efficient tracking systems.  It addresses both vulnerabilities of 
insufficient agency oversight and confusing supply chains by allowing both government and 
consumer to hold producers accountable for the safety of their products.   As a result, as with 
HACCP programs, both market forces and government regulation will be working cooperatively 
towards enhanced food safety.  
Currently, the average U.S. consumer often does not know how the food they buy in the 
supermarket relates to the farms and other facilities that produced them.  An example from the 
First Family serves to illustrate this point.  When he announced his Food Safety Working Group, 
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President  Obama  emphasized  his  concern  for  food  safety  by  referencing  the  peanut  product 
recall then in effect, stating,  
In the end, food safety is something I take seriously, not just as your President, but as a 
parent.  When  I  heard  peanut  products  were  being  contaminated  earlier  this  year,  I 
immediately thought of my 7-year old daughter, Sasha, who has peanut butter sandwiches 
for lunch probably three times a week. No parent should have to worry that their child is 
going to get sick from their lunch.
152 
This personal commentary reveals how much lack of attention given by consumers to which 
products are actually affected by a broad recall: none of the major brands of jarred peanut butter 
were recalled.
153  Granted, the President spoke of his initial uninformed reaction, but reinforcing 
inaccurate first impressions in his Weekly Address only serves to confuse the public about the 
difference between a recall of a specific producer’s crop and a recall of a whole nation’s supply 
of that food. 
Traceability could also help the family farmer immensely.  One of the major economic 
impacts of a major outbreak, especially of a fresh product that goes relatively unchanged from 
“farm to fork,” is a crippling longterm depression of the whole industry, even from producers 
who  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  contamination.
154    Such  a  spreading  of  economic  impact 
depresses the incentive for a single producer to participate in best practices: “as long as some 
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growers  do  not  adopt  safer  practices,  all  growers  face  the  economic  consequences  of  an 
outbreak.”
155 
Many of the current bills before Congress suggest increased traceability measures.  The 
main  problem  is  one  of  technology.  FSMA  directs  FSA  to  “establish  a  national  traceability 
system” to trace an article of food through all stages of production and distribution, but quickly 
caveats by saying that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as requiring the Administrator 
to prescribe a specific technology for the maintenance of records or labeling of food to carry out 
the requirements of this section.”
156  The Senate FDA Food Safety Modernization Act is even 
more vague, simply telling the FDA to “establish a pilot project in coordination with the produce 
industry to explore and evaluate methods for rapidly and effectively tracking and tracing fruits 
and  vegetables.”
157    Other  bills  are  more  specific,  calling  for  switching  to  electronic 
recordkeeping and adding farms and restaurants to the current tracking system
158 or suggesting 
options including “a recordkeeping and audit system, a secure, online database, or registered 
identification.”
159  While the specifics of what constitutes the best traceback system may be 
unclear, what is relatively certain is that improvements in traceability are attainable in the current 
system, and at the relatively low cost of maintaining a database.
160  Any reform of food safety in 
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this country should include such a system, which can influence both prospective market forces 
for safer food and retrospective responses to outbreaks. 
F.  Increased Agency Enforcement Is an Empty Shell That Is Only Modestly Helpful 
While several bills call for increased enforcement authority of the FDA, such authority 
probably will not make too much of a difference without other more prospective alterations in 
food safety.  As noted by experts in food safety, one of the weaknesses of FDA’s current system 
is how retrospective it is.
161  Increased ability to enforce continues to address only retrospective 
issues and will not significantly increase the FDA’s food safety capabilities without  other 
reforms.  Mandatory recall power, for example, may not be necessary, especially given how 
powerful voluntary recall power already is.  Very few producers would resist a voluntary recall 
in the face of bad press of an outbreak, especially in a world of increased traceability.  Other 
enforcement capabilities aren’t particularly helpful if they do not come with increased food 
safety measure to enforce – the ability to detain a product that fails to meet food safety standards 
is a weak ability if there are few food safety standards set forth by the responsible agency. 
Overall, this category of reform seems relatively low impact but moderately helpful in 
order to keep bad actors from damaging the market for more worthy producers.  It helps the 
small farmer (and any other producer of any size) by simply keeping the playing field level.  It 
also promotes the public health by giving the FDA a stick with which to keep producers in line 
while the market for safe food provides a relatively obvious carrot. 
G. Tiered Approach to Food Safety Can Encourage Both Safety and Sustainability 
Though several of the proposals above have the potential to encourage both food safety 
and family farms, especially HACCP-like risk analysis and traceability measures, the current 
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proposals are all incomplete.  Looking back at the original critiques of food safety, we can see 
where this incompleteness lies.  All five categories of proposals really only address the first three 
problems  –  confusing  lines  of  agency  authority,  the  lack  of  authority  and  oversight,  and 
confusing supply chains.  None confronts the fourth problem, the lack of diversity in food supply 
markets. 
Regulation that supports market diversity in food production can increase public health 
by encouraging competition between suppliers to make healthier, tastier food cheaper and more 
available  to  the  average  consumer.    In  addition,  when  food  does  get  contaminated,  a  more 
diverse supply chain can mitigate the damage of a single bad source or even bad actor – how 
much less would have been the damage of the Peanut Corporation of America’s failure to correct 
its poor manufacturing procedures if its products had not been so pervasive in the market. As 
noted by the CEO of a large family farm in California in testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Agriculture in April, 2009, “there is no such thing as zero risk, 
[so] government must also be able to assure the public that even if something does go horribly 
wrong  in  an  isolated  case,  consumers  can  continue  to  have  confidence.”
162    More  diverse 
suppliers would mean that any one’s failure would not be as crippling to the whole market, 
allowing the country to bounce back quickly as soon as regulators and suppliers trace the culprit 
foods and halt production. 
In combination with the better proposals of the bills discussed above, a sliding scale 
system of regulation could address these problems by creating a regulatory space for smaller 
producers and processors in which they could compete with the economies of scale of larger 
establishments through savings on the cost of regulations such as certification, registration, and 
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even inspection.   In addition, such a system would benefit the small family farm that Congress 
has heralded for so long.   
A sliding scale would fit well into the other methods of regulation discussed above for 
food safety purposes, and also support the popular food sustainability and local food movements.  
As  traceability  improves,  the  ability  to  have  producers  establish  themselves  as  local-only 
providers would improve as well, and such producers then could be given more leeway in food 
safety protocols or at least not have to submit to the same level of physical inspection and 
oversight.  Because their products would be traceable, local farmers would have incentive to 
uphold the highest practical levels of food safety because a single incident could permanently 
destroy their business.  Because their products would be slightly cheaper than they would be 
otherwise,  local  farmers  could  also  benefit  more  from  the  public’s  goodwill  towards  local 
products if they can afford them. 
One  might  argue  that  letting  smaller  farms  incur  lower  food  safety  system  costs  is 
dangerous to the public health.  After all, not all local organic food is as safe as highly processed 
foods  that  have  gone  through  many  rounds  of  sanitation,  irradiation,  pasteurization,  or 
combinations thereof.   For example, a recent New York Times article relates the story of a 
California nurse who contracted a nerve disease that kept her on life support and forced her to 
communicate  solely  by  blinking  for  three  months  after  drinking  raw  milk  infected  with 
campylobacter, which would be destroyed easily by pasteurization.
163  However, with the correct 
cost-benefit analysis, a sliding scale could account for slight increases in risk in local foods and 
maintain  the  right  level  of  oversight  to  varying  sizes  and  kinds  of  producers  while  still 
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encouraging smaller farms in concurrence with a policy to encourage market diversity as well as 
the broader policy of supporting family farms.
164  
Part IV.  Conclusion 
Two powerful movements surround the current climate of food policy in the United 
States.  In one movement, consumers are rediscovering the desirability of local and organic 
foods, supporting small local farms through CSAs and other programs.   This movement 
reinforces and reanimates the long-standing Congressional policy to protect family farms, 
especially the idyllic concept of the small family farm.  In the other movement, consumers and 
legislators are demanding increased safety in the face of recent widespread foodborne illness 
outbreaks from foods normally considered not only safe but virtuous, such as spinach and 
lettuce.   As legislators scramble to respond to this second movement that is worried about the 
vulnerabilities of our food safety systems, they would do well to remember the first movement, 
too.  At first the connection between family farms and food safety may seem a stretch, but a 
closer look at the best proposed food safety reforms reveals that those proposals that are the best 
for food safety – hazard risk analysis, increased traceability, and support for diverse supply 
chains – can also benefit family farms.   A good food safety bill that recognizes both the 
regulatory and market-driven problems of the current food supply can encompass the best of 
both worlds.  It can keep our food safe for our daughters, as President Obama recently pledged.  
And as President Reagan declared of another food-related bill over two decades ago, it can also 
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honor and support the “hard-working men and women who till the fields and tend the herds . . . 
and the thousands of small towns and communities in which they live.”
165
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Appendix 
List of Acronyms 
CDC – Centers for Disease Control 
CSA – Community Supported Agriculture 
FDA – Food and Drug Administration 
FSA – Food Safety Administration (proposed agency) 
FSIS – Food Safety and Inspection Service (part of USDA) 
FSMA – Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 875 111th Cong. (2009) (not the Food 
Safety Modernization Act, S. 510, 111th Cong. (2009)) 
GAO – U.S. Governmental Accountability Office 
GAP – Good Agricultural Practice 
GMP – Good Manufacturing Practice 
HACCP – Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point program 
HHS – Health and Human Services 
NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture 
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Table 1.   
Few Family Farms Would Experience Significant Consolidation in Interactions with Regulators 
By the Merging of Food Safety Agencies 
 




% of farms 
that have  
3 or fewer 
commodities   
Limited Resource  197734  92.5   
Retirement  338671  97.3   
Residential/lifestyle  837542  94.9   
Low sales  395781  87.9   
Total farms (under $100k)  1769728  94  % of small farms with three or fewer 
commodities 
       
Medium Sales  133299  55.8   
Total farms (under $250k)  1903027  91  % of small & medium farms with three or 
fewer commodities 
       




% of farms 
that raise  
none or one 
commodity   
Limited resource  197734  57.2   
Retirement  338671  56.6   
Residential/lifestyle  837542  58.2   
Low sales  395781  46.5   
Total farms (under $100k)  1769728  55  % of small farms with one commodity 
       
Medium Sales  133299  14.2   
Total farms (under $250k)  1903027  52  % of small & medium farms with one 
commodity 
Data and classification from ROBERT A. HOPPE ET AL., USDA, STRUCTURE AND FINANCES OF US 
FARMS: FAMILY FARM REPORT, 2007 EDITION, EIB No. 24, 10 tbl. 2 (2007). 
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Table 2 











Annual Cases from 




and poultry foods 
Salmonella 
696,000 - 
3,840,000  870 – 1920  25-50%  97,000 - 1,800,000  120 – 920 
STEC O157 
(E.coli)  8,000 - 16,000  176 – 433  25%  2,000 - 4,000  44 -108 
Campylobacter 
jejuni or coli 
1,100,000 - 
7,000,000  110 – 511  25%  275,000 - 1,750,000  28 - 128 
Listeria 
monocytogenes  950 - 1800  230 – 485  50%  475 - 900  115 - 243 
 
*Data in first three columns all reflect 1996 rates, prior to HACCP program and the documented decrease in 
three out of four of these pathogen as described, supra text accompanying note 47.  These should not affect the 
estimates for absolute numbers of non-meat foodborne illnesses in the last two columns, assuming there has 
been no change in incidence rates because there has been no significant change in food safety measures in the 
FDA since 1996. 
 
**assumes death rates are equivalent in foodborne and non foodborne cases 
           
Estimates from derived from 1996 data on meat and poultry foodborne illnesse supplied in Elise H. 
Golan et al., USDA, Tracing the Costs and Benefits of Improvements in Food Safety, AER 791 5 tbl. 2 
(2000).  These pathogens are chosen because they are both prevalent and relatively well-documented. 
There are, however, over 40 different foodborne pathogens that are known to cause illness in lesses 
degrees.  Id. at 4. 
           
Even assuming all of the illnesses came from fresh produce alone, the incidence rate of illness and 
death is extremely small.  If 1,000,000,000 servings of produce are eaten each day (the lowest possible 
estimate from the testimony given in April to the House of Representatives), this means that someone 
contracts one of these main pathogens at a rate of 1 in 100,000 servings of produce, and someone dies 
at a rate of just 1 in 300,000,000 servings of produce.  For comparison, assuming a person eats the full 
recommended 5 servings of fruits and vegetables every day (which is an overestimate for most 
Americans), from the age of 2 to 76 (the average life expectancy of an American), she would eat just 
135,000 servings of produce her whole life. 
 